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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
interest of requiring tortfeasors to make the injured whole, is logically
supportable, though it seems to give an unusual importance to plead-
ing niceties.
In 1957 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 4 in
Gonzales v. International Association of Machinists,5 a California
case factually similar to Mahoney. In that case the expelled union
member sought reinstatement to the union, and damages for loss of
wages and mental distress on a breach of contract theory. The
California court granted all relief sought, basing its award of damages
measured by back pay on the ground that it was "not for an unfair
labor practice, but for breach of contract and as incidental to the
restoration to plaintiff of his right of membership."'" If this decision
is affirmed by the Supreme Court, new doubt would be cast on the
efficacy of Mahoney. FRED BRUHN
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Local Government Law-Declaratory Judgment-Municipal Corporations. P, a
Pasco taxpayer, brought an action for declaratory judgment and injunction, claiming
the city of Pasco could not lease municipally owned land for a parking lot. D city
relied upon the following: RCW 35.24.010: "Every city of the third class... may
control and dispose of [property] for the common benefit...." ; RCW 35.24.300: "The
city council ... shall have power to... control, lease, sublease, convey or otherwise
dispose of [property] ... ;; to lease any waterfront and other lands adjacent thereto
owned by it...; to lease... portions of its streets which bound upon or terminate in
its waterfront....; and Laws 1955, c. 294: "The city council of the city of Pasco...
shall have power to lease, sell, or otherwise dispose [of the land in question]...."
Held, (6-3) for P taxpayer. Miller v. Pasco, 50 Wn.2d 229, 310 P.2d 863 (1957).
The court's reasoning and conclusions were as follows:
(1) P was a proper party plaintiff under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,
RCW 7.24, because he was a taxpayer "and otherwise meets the qualifications of an
interested person, as defined by RCW 7.24.020." If this means taxpayers are proper
parties plaintiff to bring declaratory judgment actions to contest the legality of acts of
municipal officers, then the decision is of first impression on this point in Washington.
(See 87 A.L.R. 1243; 114 A.L.R. 1366.)
(2) RCW 3524.010 does not give power ot lease, because "may control" does not
give power to delegate control, and "dispose of" means to sell. RCW 35.24.300 does
not give power to lease anything except waterfront lands, because specific provisions
control the general grant of power to lease.
(3) Laws 1955, c. 294, is unconstitutional. Washington Const. art. 2, § 28, prohibits
special laws granting corporate powers. This applies to municipal corporations.
14352 U.S. 966 (1957).
15142 Cal. App.2d 207, 298 P.2d 92 (1956).
16 298 P.2d at 99.
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Municipal Corporations-Discharge of Seattle City Employees-Civil Service-
Seattle City Service Commission. State ex rel. West v. Seattle, 50 Wn.2d 94, 309 P.2d
751 (1957). P, a Seattle civil service employee in the lighting department, was dis-
charged by the department personnel supervisor. The Seattle civil service commission
sustained her dismissal, and she appealed its decision. Seattle's city charter provides:
Art. VII, § 8: "He [superintendent of lighting] shall appoint... all officers and
employes in his department." Art. XVI, § 12: "Any officer or employee [in such civil
service] may be removed by the appointing power only upon the filing with the com-
mission of a statement in writing of the reasons therefor." Art. XVI, § 4: "The [civil
service] commission shall make rules... for... removals... ." Seattle civil service
commission Rule 1 defines "appointing officer" as "the head of a department... or a
person designated by such head of department with authority to appoint, discipline and
remove subordinates."
Held, (5-0) for P. Art. VII, § 8, and Art. XVI, § 12, taken together, mean only the
superintendent of lighting it; person may remove lighting department employees. Civil
service commission Rule 1 was violative of the city charter and so void. Therefore
P's discharge by the department personnel supervisor was ineffective.
This surprisingly strict construction of the Seattle charter will apply to the depart-
ments of engineering, water, buildings, transportation and probably to public health,
as well as to lighting. It is understood that those departments are now insuring that
discharges are signed by their heads, so the precise issue of this case probably will
not recur. However, the judicial approach of strictly construing city charters may be
used again.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Landlord and Tenant-Unlawful Detainer-Jurisdiction Over
the Person. The opinion of the supreme court of Washington in the
case of Sowers v. Lewis1 changes the law of Washington in the action
of unlawful detainer. The court, ignoring past Washington cases,
held that the notice which is to be given a tenant before an action
of unlawful detainer2 can be brought is a jurisdictional condition
1.49 Wn.2d 891, 307 P2d 1064 (1957).
2 RCW 59.12.030: A tenant of real property for a term less than life is guilty of
unlawful detainer either:
(3) When he continues in possession in person or by subtenant after a default in
the payment of rent, and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the
payment of the rent or the surrender of the detained premises, served (in man-
ner RCW 59.12.040 provided) in behalf of the person entitled to the rent upon
the person owing it, has remained uncomplied with for the period of three days
after service thereof. The notice may be served at any time after the rent
becomes due.
(4) When he continues in possession inperson or by subtenant after a neglect or
failure to keep or perform any other condition or covenant of the lease or agree-
ment under which the property is held, including any covenant not to assign
or sublet, than one for the payment of rent, and after notice in writing requiring
in the alternative the performance of such condition or covenant or the sur-
render of the property, served (in manner in RCW 59.12.040 provided) upon
him, and if there is a subtenant in actual possession of the premises, also upon
such subtenant, shall remain uncomplied with for ten days after service thereof.
Within ten days after the service of such notice the tenant, or any subtenant in
actual occupation of the premises, or any mortgagee of the term, or other
person interested in its continuance, may perform such condition or covenant
and thereby save the lease from such forfeiture."
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